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Aging Disgracefully: Do Economic Laws Remain
Rational in Spite of Changed Circumstances?
Johanna Talcott*
INTRODUCTION
Rational basis review—especially as it applies to economic
regulation—needs a little more bite. Many scholars, practitioners, and
judges have critiqued the Supreme Court’s unfavorable treatment of
economic liberties and the highly deferential nature of its lowest standard of
review.1 Some have advocated for changes in the Court’s approach to both,
such as bulking up the scrutiny of rational basis review or eliminating
distinctions between constitutional rights.2 While such calls are wellfounded and forceful, it is unlikely that there would be any substantial
overhaul of nearly a century of firmly established constitutional
jurisprudence.3 An alternative method is that the courts can implement
*
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J.D. candidate, May 2016, Florida International University College of Law; M.A., The
Pennsylvania State University; B.A., University of Florida. I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to
Dominique Pando Bucci, Jeremy Talcott, and Bryan Wilson for their help with this endeavor.
1
See, e.g., Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 480–83 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Brown, J.,
concurring); Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing and Reg., 469 S.W.3d 69, 98–99 (Tex. 2016) (Willett, J.,
concurring); Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479 (2008); Aaron Belzer, Putting
the “Review” Back in Rational Basis Review, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 339 (2014); Marc P. Florman, The
Harmless Pursuit of Happiness: Why “Rational Basis with Bite” Review Makes Sense for Challenges to
Occupational Licenses, 58 LOY. L. REV. 721 (2012); Elizabeth Price Foley, Judicial Engagement,
Written Constitutions, and the Value of Preservation: The Case of Individual Rights, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 909 (2012); Jessica E. Hacker, The Return to Lochnerism? The Revival of Economic Liberties from
David to Goliath, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 675 (2002); Clark Neily, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the
Rational Basis Test, 1 NYU J.L. & LIBERTY 898 (2005); Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The
Doctrine of Economic Due Process Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1363 (1990); Austin Raynor,
Economic Liberty and the Second-Order Rational Basis Test, 99 Va. L. Rev. 1065 (2013); Timothy
Sandefur, Equality of Opportunity in the Regulatory Age: Why Yesterday’s Rationality Review Isn’t
Enough, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 457 (2004); Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living, 6 CHAP. L.
REV. 207 (2003); Neelum J. Wadhwani, Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801
(2006).
2
Some scholars have advocated for shifting the burden of proof back onto the government in
rational basis review cases. See, e.g., Belzer, supra note 1, at 373 (proposing a “rationale review
standard” for all nonsuspect class equal protection challenges, in which a successful prima facie case of
an inappropriate classification would shift the burden on the government to justify the rationale behind
the classification); Foley, supra note 1, at 927 (advocating for a return to the “old-school rational basis
review” utilized by the pre-New Deal Supreme Court, which required the government to “prove a close
fit between the means chosen and the purpose of the law”). Cf. Barnett, supra note 1, at 1499–1500
(advocating for elimination of the fundamental/non-fundamental rights dichotomy under due process in
favor of a “presumption of liberty” that is generally rebuttable by the government).
3
See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1,
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minor doctrinal approaches, which comport with existing Supreme Court
jurisprudence, but incrementally shift the law towards strengthened judicial
scrutiny and greater preservation of economic liberty—sort of a “rational
basis review with nibble.”4 One such modest approach is the changed
circumstances doctrine.5
When courts adjudicate legislation that impacts economic liberty, the
applicable level of scrutiny, rational basis review, requires only that the
government articulate a legitimate government interest (and if not, the court
can even conceive of one) and assert that the law is a rationally related
means of achieving that interest.6 Challenged legislation is afforded an
extremely strong presumption of constitutionality and the courts have no
obligation to conduct any fact-finding whatsoever into the rationality of the
government’s actions.7 In order to prevail, a challenger must essentially
prove that every conceivable reason that the legislature may have had in
passing the legislation is irrational.8 In practice, this is a nearly
insurmountable task.9 For example, the Supreme Court sided with the
plaintiffs in only ten out of one hundred rational basis review cases between
1973 and 1996.10 By the Court’s logic, all of those challenged laws were
constitutionally rational.
But does a law remain rational indefinitely? Given the rapid clip of
social and technological change––and the notorious lag of government––
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1–4 (2001); see also Foley, supra note 1, at 927.
4
The author cannot locate any other instances of this phrase being used, but it seems an
appropriate descriptor for an approach that does not substantively disrupt established law or doctrine and
applies only in a relatively narrow range of cases.
5
See discussion infra pages 506–523.
6
See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–15 (1993); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 319–20 (1993). In equal protection cases, the Court applies rational basis review in challenges to
legislation that distinguishes between economic or social classes (nonsuspect classes). Strict scrutiny is
reserved for legislation that distinguishes between suspect classes (race, national origin, and alienage) or
burdens a fundamental right, and intermediate scrutiny for legislation that distinguishes between quasisuspect classes (gender, illegitimacy). In substantive due process cases, the Supreme Court bifurcates
individual liberties into fundamental and non-fundamental rights. Fundamental rights are those which
are “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
7
Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315 (“[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”).
8
Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (“A statute is presumed constitutional and the burden is on the one
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”)
(citations and quotations omitted).
9
See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing rational basis review as
“minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact”).
10 Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term
Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 416 (1999).
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laws and regulations risk becoming outdated as the factual circumstances
that justified their enactment begin to disappear.11 Governments prudently
leave many outdated laws unenforced, such as the Pennsylvania statute that
requires motorists to stop every mile on rural roads to send up rocket
signals, the Michigan law that prohibits a married woman from going to the
hair stylist without her husband’s permission, or the ban on Sunday yoyoing that is on the books in a handful of states.12
With economic regulation, however, governments may continue to
enforce laws even after drastic changes in factual circumstances render
them obsolete. This might be the case, for example, when some new
product, business model, or innovation emerges that the legislature could
not have anticipated and did not account for in the existing regulatory
framework.13 Established businesses, which have often invested
considerable costs to operate under existing regulations, are understandably
frustrated when their competitors are not bound by the same restrictive and
expensive rules.14 Governments often respond by continuing to enforce the
outdated regulations, or requiring indirect competitors to comply with
existing regulations, even when doing so verges on the absurd.15
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11
A cursory Google News search suggests that this is a fairly common feature throughout the
world. See, e.g., Kathleen Gray, Michigan Laws in Crosshairs: Don’t Cuss, Dye Chicks, USA TODAY
(Mar. 24, 2015), www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/03/24/mich-laws-crosshairs-cuss-dye-chic
ks/70404872; Tiffany Owens, Ala. Legislators Seek to Repeal Antiquated Laws, CULLMAN TIMES (Mar.
17, 2015), www.cullmantimes.com/news/ala-legislators-seek-to-repeal-antiquated-laws/article_a0619e4
2-cc47-11e4-91d5-af3fc27c9839.html; Jane Walsh, Ireland to Revoke 5,782 Outdated Laws, IRISH
CENT. (Mar. 17, 2015), www.irishcentral.com/news/Ireland-to-revoke-5782-outdated-laws.html.
12
Stephanie Morrow, Top Craziest Laws Still on the Books, LEGAL ZOOM (Oct. 2009),
www.legalzoom.com/articles/top-craziest-laws-still-on-the-books.
13
See Erica Taschler, A Crumbling Monopoly: The Rise of Uber and the Taxis Industry’s
Struggle to Survive, LOY. SCH L.: NEWS AND VIEWS (June 2015), www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/cen
ters/antitrust/pdfs/publications/newsviews/Erica%20Taschler%20New%20%20Views%20With%20Edit
s%20%20Footnotes.pdf.
14
See id. The government shares in the frustration when businesses find ways to lawfully
circumvent the rules. See, e.g., Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012); see also Dan
Morgan, Sarah Cohen & Gilbert M. Gaul, Dairy Industry Crushed Innovator Who Bested Price–Control
System, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2006), www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/12/09/AR
2006120900925.html.
15
For example, one rule in an arcane web of Pennsylvania funeral industry regulations prohibits
the serving of food or intoxicating beverages at a funeral home. The Third Circuit upheld the regulation,
which dated back to the fifties. Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 86 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 220 (2014); see also Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing and Reg., 469 S.W.3d 69, 73–74 (Tex. 2016)
(evaluating a requirement for eyebrow threaders to obtain expensive and time-consuming cosmetologist
licenses). Cf. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (involving a prohibition
against non-dentists from performing simple teeth whitening procedures). Unfortunately, governments
seldom respond to these conflicts by lifting the burdensome regulations for everyone. One recent
example is the dispute in Austin, Texas, over Uber and Lyft refusing to abide by background check
requirements imposed on taxi drivers. The popular ride-sharing services ultimately departed the city. See
Jared Meyer, What Elizabeth Warren Gets Wrong About Uber, REASON (May 23, 2016),
www.reason.com/archives/2016/05/23/what-elizabeth-warren-gets-wrong-about-u; see also J.D. Tuccille,
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The Supreme Court contemplated that factual circumstances could
change enough to render continued enforcement of a law irrational. In the
seminal case United States v. Carolene Products, the Court was clear that
“the constitutionality of a statute predicated upon the existence of a
particular state of facts may be challenged by showing to the court that
those facts have ceased to exist.”16 This changed circumstances doctrine
requires courts to evaluate the rationality of a law with regard to the
objective factual circumstances existing when the law is challenged, rather
than when it was enacted. The Court never overruled Carolene’s mandate17
and consistently gives weight to changed factual circumstances in other
areas of constitutional law.18 Nevertheless, lower courts have diverged over
whether and how to account for changed factual circumstances in rational
basis review.19 Those courts that have deviated from Carolene’s rule have
focused on practical concerns and a perceived ambivalence from the
Supreme Court on the issue.20
This comment argues that courts that have abandoned the changed
circumstances doctrine in rational basis review have gotten it wrong. A law
must pass constitutional muster not only when enacted but also when
enforced––holding otherwise could effectively put an expiration date on
constitutional rights. The changed circumstances doctrine is an essential
component of rational basis review that, if employed consistently, serves as
a much-needed judicial limit on economic regulation. This comment first
reviews the history of the Supreme Court’s development of rational basis
review and declining protections for economic liberty. It then examines
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After Winning Regulatory Battle Against Ride-Sharing Firms, Austin Turns to Black Market and
Deregulation, REASON (May 31, 2016), www.reason.com/archives/2016/05/31/after-winning-regulatorybattle-against.
16
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938).
17
The Supreme Court has never had the opportunity to directly address the issue of whether a
law’s constitutionality must be evaluated with regard to the facts in existence at the time the law is
challenged—all of the one hundred and fifty rational basis review cases to reach the Supreme Court in
the seventy-eight years since Carolene were challenges to recently enacted legislation. Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 14, Heffner v. Murphy, 135 S. Ct. 220 (2014) (No. 14-53), 2014 WL 3530761, at *14
[hereinafter Heffner v. Murphy Petition].
18
E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612
(2013).
19
Courts’ analyses of changed circumstances have cut across several areas of constitutional law
and all levels of judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen, Do Laws Have a Constitutional Shelf
Life?, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 59 (2015); Maria Ponomarenko, Changed Circumstances and Judicial Review, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1419 (2014); Sean G. Williamson, Contemporary Contextual Analysis: Accounting for
Changed Factual Conditions Under the Equal Protection Clause, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 591 (2014).
20
E.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Reg., 763 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1985)
(finding that circumstances had not sufficiently changed to make regulation unconstitutional); Dias v.
City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2009) (permitting a due process claim to proceed on a
theory of changed circumstances).
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how the Supreme Court and other courts have approached changed factual
circumstances and their impact on a law’s constitutionality. The final
section advances arguments for why accounting for changed circumstances
is, and should remain, a basic part of the rational basis review, as well as
how the changed circumstances doctrine could benefit economic liberty.
THE RISE OF RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW AND FALL OF ECONOMIC LIBERTY

If . . . a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial
relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by
the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and

21

C M
Y K
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See sources cited supra note 1.
See, e.g., Howard Gilman, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 1–18 (1993).
23
See, e.g., Richard B. Sapphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 607 (2000) (citing several cases and articles referring to
the “softness” and “leniency” of rational basis review).
24
Jeffrey D. Jackson, Putting Rationality Back into the Rational Basis Test: Saving Substantive
Due Process and Redeeming the Promise of the Ninth Amendment, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 491, 499–501
(2011) (citing Blackstone’s Commentaries).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 502–11 (describing a number of early Due Process Clause cases).
22
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Depending on one’s political or philosophical proclivities, rational
basis review and the Court’s hostility towards economic liberty represent
either a complete derailing of fundamental constitutional principles21 or the
proper preservation of legislative power and democracy.22 Through
whichever lens this history is perceived, there can be little dispute that in
modern practice, judicial review for economic regulation has become so
highly deferential that it operates as little more than a “rubber stamp of
approval” for government action.23
The earliest roots of rational basis review lie in the English common
law, which prohibited arbitrary and unreasonable government actions and
required any intrusions into a citizen’s liberty to be justified.24 This concept
was imported into American constitutional law to preserve life, liberty, and
property, primarily with regard to procedural due process.25 By the end of
the nineteenth century, the Court began to evaluate legislation for its impact
on substantive due process, and struggled with ascertaining which
legislative actions fell within and beyond the police power of the states.26
The tool the Court developed to make this determination was a means-end
arbitrariness analysis, of which one of the earliest and clearest articulations
is found in Mugler v. Kansas:
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thereby give effect to the Constitution.27
In earlier cases, the legislation under review was granted—either
explicitly or implicitly—a presumption of constitutionality, and the
challenger bore the burden of proving it unconstitutional.28 Challengers
were largely unsuccessful: Under this general scheme, the Supreme Court
upheld as constitutional ninety-two of the ninety-eight substantive social
and economic acts of legislation that came before it.29
The infamous Supreme Court case Lochner v. New York implemented
only a minor change in the existing means-end review calculus, but its
impact and significance have reverberated broadly.30 The Court’s
development of the highly deferential rational basis review that exists today
reflects an explicit rejection of the type of searching scrutiny utilized in
Lochner and its progeny, as well as Lochner’s protection of economic
liberty. The Lochner era is often characterized as a time when an
overzealous, activist Supreme Court sought to stymie progressive
government action by striking down laws and regulations with which it
disagreed under the guise of an unenumerated right to contract.31 A far more
accurate characterization is that the Court variously validated and
invalidated economic regulations during this time period by conducting
careful factual inquiries in an effort to satisfy the established means-end
arbitrariness test.32 Understood properly, Lochner serves as an example of
27

Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661–62 (1887).
Jackson, supra note 24, at 510.
29
Id. at 508.
30
See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER 1–8 (2011) (describing the widespread,
but misplaced, derision of Lochner by judges, scholars, journalists, and even President Obama).
31
See id., at 1–8; see also Neily, supra note 1, at 903. This strong disapproval of Lochner has
enjoyed uniquely broad overlap between liberals and conservatives, albeit for largely different reasons.
See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, The Return of Lochner, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 529 (2015).
At the core of most Lochner criticisms is the perception of an overreaching, unrestrained judiciary. Id.
For liberals, this hinges on the perceptions of the Court’s unseemly protection of a right—the right to
contract—that should not warrant constitutional protection and of the Court’s inappropriate supplanting
of the legislature’s wisdom and judgment with its own theoretical preferences. Id. Conservatives,
although far more sympathetic to economic rights, are generally opposed to the protection of rights that
are not specifically enumerated in the text of the Constitution. Id. This conservative preference for
judicial restraint is largely in response to the Warren and Burger Courts’ willingness to identify and
protect unenumerated rights. Id. at 528. The conservative angle in the anti-Lochner orthodoxy is
evolving, however, as it has become clear that substantial judicial deference has led to the virtual
elimination of fundamental constitutional rights––most severely economic liberty. Id. at 531.
32
See BERNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 1–8. In fact, the Supreme Court decided ninety-seven cases
regarding substantive due process between 1913 and 1920, and in a meager five of those cases was the
legislation overturned. Jackson, supra note 24, at 513. Four cases from the Lochner era dealing with
minimum wage and hour laws—Lochner v. City of New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908), Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of Dist. of Colum., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and W. Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)—particularly illustrate the Court’s lack of consistency (i.e.,
the Lochner Court did not strike down every progressive economic regulation that came before it, as is
28
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the type of thorough factual analysis that courts undertake when
considering challenges based on changed circumstances.
The Lochner facts are straightforward—the New York Bakeshop Act
placed a number of regulations on bakeries, including strict limits on the
number of hours that employees could voluntarily work.33 As it had
previously done, the Court recognized that the statute interfered with the
right to contract between the employer and employees, but that the state
could place reasonable limits upon that right.34 Significantly, the Lochner
Court changed its approach to due process analysis and implicitly shifted
the burden onto the government to prove that the interference was a
reasonable exercise of the police power.35
The state proffered a number of public health and safety reasons for
limiting the number of hours that bakers may work, such as preventing
fatigue, limiting flour inhalation, and ensuring the cleanliness of bakers and
their products.36 The Court looked at each alleged justification with a
skeptical eye and found that the limitations on worker’s hours made little
sense in light of the numerous other rules that regulated the bakeshop
facilities themselves.37 Lochner should not be characterized as a wholesale
dismissal of legislation on the sole basis that it impeded the right to
contract.38 The Court simply found—through thoughtful factual inquiry—
that the hourly limitations did not actually further the government’s
purported objectives and therefore exceeded the power of the state to
infringe upon the right to contract.39

06/27/2016 12:34:37
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so often suggested).
33
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. Bakers were prohibited from working more than ten hours in a day,
and more than sixty hours in a week. Id.
34
Id. The treatment of something like the liberty of contract as a fundamental right first appeared
in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590–93 (1897) (striking down a statute that prohibited a
Louisiana citizen from contracting for marine insurance with a New York insurance company that was
not licensed to do business in the state). During this time the Supreme Court recognized a very broad
definition of liberty under the Due Process Clause. Jackson, supra note 24, at 510.
35
Id. at 511.
36
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 60–63.
37
Id. at 62-63. The Court noted that one inference from the government’s justifications for the
bakeshop laws was that one could draw a distinction between the healthfulness of bread baked by a
person who works only ten hours a day and that of bread baked by a person who works eleven hours a
day. Id. The bread baked by the latter—according to the government’s logic—was no longer healthful or
fit to be sold to the public. Id. The Court found this distinction to be “unreasonable and entirely
arbitrary.” Id.
38
Neily, supra note 1, at 903.
39
Id. The Court was also appropriately suspicious of the legislative intent behind the bakeshop
laws. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62 (“The connection, if any exists, is too shadowy and thin to build any
argument for the interference of the legislature.”); id. at 63 (“It gives rise to at least a suspicion that there
was some other motive dominating the legislature than the purpose to serve the public health or
welfare.”). The union-backed Bakeshop Act was passed in 1895. David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New
York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1482 (2005). The historical evidence
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In the following thirty years or so, the Court used the approach in
Lochner to both strike down and uphold wage and hour restrictions.40 But
by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,41 the Court made clear that it was no
longer willing to meaningfully protect any economic right––let alone the
unenumerated right to contract––from government interference.42
Considering a minimum wage regulation for women and children, the Court
determined that the law was a reasonable, non-arbitrary, and nondiscriminatory means of regulating the relationships between employers
and the employed.43 In this final case of the Lochner era, the Court
expressed its vision of the proper role of the judiciary with regard to
economic regulation: The courts are “both incompetent and unauthorized to
deal” with assessing the “adequacy or practicability of the law enacted.”44
Therefore, the Court maintained, the legislature was the only appropriate
arbiter of the wisdom or necessity of economic regulations, and “every
plausible presumption is in favor of [their] validity.”45
The presumption of constitutionality for economic regulation became
firmly established in United States v. Carolene Products.46 The Court

06/27/2016 12:34:37
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indicates that the Bakeshop Act was passed primarily as an effort to protect large, unionized bakeries
against competition from small, immigrant enterprises. Id. at 1476. The growing number of Italian,
French, and Jewish immigrant bakeries posed a substantial business threat because they were able to
produce comparable products at lower prices. Id. This was primarily because the immigrants set up oldfashioned bakeries in the basements of cheap tenement buildings and their employees were on call
nearly twenty-four hours a day, often sleeping on the floors of the bakery. Id. at 1477.
40
Just three years after Lochner, the Supreme Court reached the opposite result for similar
legislation that applied only to women. Using the same Lochner analysis in Muller v. Oregon, the Court
found that minimum wage and weekly hour limits for women in certain industrial-type workplaces, like
laundries and factories, were constitutional. 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908). The Court considered a number
of scientific and sociological studies about the supposed limited physical abilities of women and
potential injurious effects of long working hours on the health of women and their offspring and found
that the state provided enough evidence to show that the regulations furthered the state’s legitimate
interest in protecting women’s physical well-being. Id. at 420. Fifteen years after Muller, the Supreme
Court invalidated a similar law fixing the minimum wage for women and children in the District of
Columbia. In Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of District of Columbia, the Court emphasized the passing of
the Nineteenth Amendment, which granted women the right to vote, as an indication that the “ancient
inequality of the sexes . . . has continued with diminishing intensity.” 261 U.S. 525, 552 (1923). The
Court no longer accepted the notion that adult women should be subjected to laws and regulations that
restricted their right to contract when the same restrictions could not be imposed upon adult men under
similar circumstances. Id. Minimum wage and hour regulations may have imposed permissible
restrictions on women’s liberty of contract at a time when women were essentially second-class citizens,
but any rationality disappeared once other rights and responsibilities of women were clearly established.
Id. at 553.
41
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
42
Id. at 392.
43
Id. at 397.
44
Id. at 398 (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537–38 (1934)).
45
Id.
46
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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Id. at 154.
Id. at 152–153 n.4.
49
See Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products Footnote,
46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 165–67 (2004).
50 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4. Carolene is far less known for its subsequent history
and the dictum that would be later used to strike down the same legislation that Carolene upheld. See
Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1972).
51
See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
52
Id. at 486.
53
Id.
54
Randy E. Barnett, Keynote Remarks: Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee Optical,
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 845 (2012) (describing the historical circumstances surrounding Williamson v.
Lee Optical, including the protectionist motives behind many of Louisiana’s regulations of the visual
care industry).
55
Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. Okla. 1954), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The district court
48

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 111 Side A

acknowledged that a challenger may produce evidence to overcome the
presumption, but maintained that where the propriety of legislation is “at
least debatable,” the dispute should be resolved in favor of the
government.47 The Court tucked into the famous “Footnote Four” the
foundation for the tiered approach to judicial constitutional review.48
Carolene’s footnote is recognized for enabling the Court to serve as a
champion of civil rights by creating heightened judicial scrutiny for
legislation “affecting discrete and insular minorities.”49 The footnote also
had the effect of relegating economic liberty to a lower echelon of
constitutional importance––a status that persists today.50 But, as detailed in
the following section, Carolene is crucial precedent for the proposition that
an economic regulation’s constitutionality must be evaluated with regard to
the factual circumstances that exist at the time the law is challenged.
In Williamson v. Lee Optical, the Court rendered the presumption of
constitutionality virtually irrebuttable.51 The State of Oklahoma passed a
number of laws regulating the visual care industry.52 The law made it illegal
for opticians to take old lenses and place them into new frames, or use a
device to measure the strength of an existing prescription to fabricate new
lenses, unless the wearer first visited a licensed ophthalmologist or
optometrist to obtain a prescription.53 Not only did this require customers to
take an additional, costly step before they were able to upgrade their
outdated or broken frames, but it substantially reduced business for
opticians while preserving a virtual monopoly for ophthalmologists.54
The district court in Williamson v. Lee Optical undertook a thorough
and searching inquiry into the effects and apparent motivation of the
legislature in enacting the regulations and found that they bore no rational
relationship to the government’s proffered purpose of protecting the public
welfare, health, and safety.55 But the Supreme Court reversed, establishing

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 111 Side B

06/27/2016 12:34:37

11 - TALCOTT_FINAL_6.26.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

504

FIU Law Review

6/26/16 8:32 PM

[Vol. 11:495

the “rubber stamp” rational basis review that survives today.56 The Court
determined that a law would be upheld as long as the government might
have had any conceivable rationale for enacting the legislation as a way to
correct a perceived evil.57 Although the plaintiff had convincingly negated
all of the state’s alleged rationales for enacting the laws, the Supreme Court
helpfully hypothesized several additional reasons that the government had
never even suggested.58 If rational basis review was not deferential enough,
the Court was now practically joining the government’s legal team.
A few Supreme Court decisions since Williamson v. Lee Optical have
affirmed and further refined this extremely deferential version of rational
basis review––virtually refining the test out of existence. In modern rational
basis review, the government is relieved of any obligation to prove that the
legislative means actually further their purported ends. And the courts have
no duty to conduct any meaningful factual analysis into the rationality of
economic regulations.59
When it comes to non-economic rights and non-suspect classes, the
Supreme Court has not always applied rational basis review consistently.
Some modern cases, in which the Court invalidated legislation under
rational basis review, have stirred up questions about how rational basis
review is applied and given some hope to those who wish for a more

06/27/2016 12:34:37
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found that an exemption for the sellers of ready-to-wear lenses, in particular, completely undermined the
state’s assertion that the measures would protect eyewear consumers. Id. at 138 (“The legislature must
not blow hot and cold!”). The court held that the law violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 143.
56
Williamson, 348 U.S. at 488.
57
Id. (“It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that
the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
58 Id. at 487 (“The legislature might have concluded that the frequency of occasions when a
prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this regulation of the fitting of eyeglasses. Likewise,
when it is necessary to duplicate a lens, a written prescription may or may not be necessary. But the
legislature might have concluded that one was needed often enough to require one in every case. Or the
legislature may have concluded that eye examinations were so critical, not only for correction of vision
but also for detection of latent ailments or diseases, that every change in frames and every duplication of
a lens should be accompanied by a prescription from a medical expert.”).
59
See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (“[A] legislative choice is not
subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or
empirical data.”); Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“A State . . . has no obligation to
produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.”); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (“Where there was evidence before the legislature reasonably
supporting the classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by
tendering evidence in court that the legislature was mistaken.”); R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 179 (1980) (Under rational basis review, “it is constitutionally irrelevant [what] reasoning in fact
underlay the legislative decision.”) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)). But see
Schware v. Bd. of Bar. Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232 (holding that the state’s denial of a bar application for
prior arrest record, use of aliases, and past Communist Party membership was not rationally related to
the applicant’s current fitness to practice law and violated the Due Process Clause).
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searching and exacting judiciary.60 What many of these cases have in
common is that the Court identified discriminatory animus against a
politically unfavored group as the pretextual motivation behind the
government’s alleged legitimate purposes.61 These cases did not involve
economic regulations; however, they reveal that the Supreme Court has not
completely renounced the idea that a challenger, armed with the right set of
facts and circumstances, can still overcome the strong presumption of
constitutionality that accompanies rational basis review.
A handful of recent decisions from lower federal courts and state
courts of last resort have indicated an increased willingness to actually
review the rationality of the factual justifications (or lack thereof) for
economic regulations. Courts have invalidated restrictions on casket sales,62
hair braiding,63 eyebrow threading,64 pest control,65 liquor sales,66 shoeshine
operations,67 and livery services.68 Whether the Supreme Court would ever
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60
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating Texas anti-sodomy law);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating Colorado state constitutional amendment that
banned anti-discrimination laws on the basis of sexual orientation); City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating city’s ordinance excluding group homes for the
intellectually disabled); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989) (invalidating state law requirement that
party own real property in order to be appointed to government board); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
Cnty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Hooper v. Bernalillo
Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985); Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973); see also Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976) (noting that rational basis review
is not “toothless”). The scrutiny utilized in these cases has been dubbed “rational basis review with
bite.”
61
E.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (homosexuals); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (intellectually
disabled individuals); Quinn, 491 U.S. at 107 (non-real property owners); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534
(hippies). One reason for extending greater judicial protection to these groups is that they are likely to be
politically powerless and “cannot themselves mandate the desired political responses” to eliminate
legislation that negatively impacts them. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
62
See St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013); Craigmiles v. Giles, 213 F.3d
220 (6th Cir. 2002).
63
See Brantley v. Kuntz, 98 F. Supp. 3d 884 (W.D. Tex. 2015); Clayton v. Steinagel, 885 F.
Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Utah 2012); Cornwell v. Hamilton, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Cal. 1999). But see
Bah v. Atty. Gen. of Tenn., 610 F. App’x 547 (6th Cir. 2015); Diwara v. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 852
A.2d 1279 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
64
See Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing and Reg., 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2016). But see
JuStringz-Century III Mall v. Bureau of Prof’l and Occupational Affairs, State Bd. of Costmetology, 22
A.3d 298 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011).
65
See Merrifield v. Lockyer, 547 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2008).
66
See Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F. Supp. 2d 733 (W.D. Ky. 2012), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 739 F.3d 936 (6th Cir. 2014) (favorable equal
protection claim reversed on appeal).
67
See Barry v. Brown, 710 F. Supp. 352, 355–56 (D.D.C. 1989).
68
See Santos v. City of Houston, 80 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994); see also Bokhari v. Metro.
Gov’t, No. 3:11-00088, 2012 WL 162372 (M.D. Tenn. 2012). But see Speed’s Auto Servs. v. City of
Portland, No. 3:12-CV-738-AC, 2013 WL 1826141 (D. Or. 2012); Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub.
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be willing to scale back its deferential stance on economic regulation is
open to speculation, but an emerging circuit split over whether naked
economic protectionism, with nothing more, is a legitimate state interest
could provide an opportunity for the Court to further define the limits of the
government’s power to interfere with economic liberties.69
What the cases in the preceding two paragraphs illustrate is that
rational basis review––even in its highly deferential state––still entails
drawing logical connections that are grounded in real-world, factual
circumstances. The Court has never endorsed an approach that permits the
government to produce “merely fanciful” justifications for economic
regulation.70 And as one district court noted: “Even the minimal rational
basis test does not require the court to muse endlessly about [a] regulation’s
conceivable objectives nor to ‘manufacture justifications’ for its continued
existence.”71 With confidence that facts still matter in rational basis review,
the following section considers what happens when facts change.
CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

C M
Y K
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Transp. Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009).
69
See infra note 232.
70
Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 134 n.10 (W.D. Okla. 1954).
71
Brown, 710 F. Supp. at 356 (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 520 (1975)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
72
See Larsen, supra note 19, at 60 n.17.
73
See Heffner v. Murphy Petition, supra note 17, at *14. Of the 150 rational basis review cases
that the Supreme Court decided since Carolene Products, all were challenges to recently enacted
legislation. Id.
74
See, e.g., Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 220
(2014); Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2009); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v.
Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Reg., 763 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1985); Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898 (3d Cir.
1982); Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Santos v. City of Houston, 80 F.
Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1972); Peck v. Fink,
2 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1924); Colorado v. Albrecht, 358 P.2d 4 (Colo. 1960); Conner v. Cone, 235 So. 2d
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The Supreme Court has consistently articulated the principle that laws
can have a “constitutional shelf life.”72 In several areas of constitutional
law, and at every level of judicial scrutiny, the Court has demonstrated that
a law’s constitutionality should be evaluated with regard to the factual
circumstances in existence at the time the law is challenged. But in the
seventy-eight years since Carolene, which established the modern, highly
deferential rational basis review, the only rational basis review cases the
Court has reviewed have involved recently enacted legislation.73 Thus, the
Court has not yet had an opportunity to reaffirm and clarify the role of the
changed circumstances doctrine in rational basis review. As a result, the
lower courts have diverged over whether and how the changed
circumstances doctrine should be applied in rational basis review cases.74
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The Changed Circumstances Doctrine Defined
It is critical to first define precisely what the changed circumstances
doctrine is and what it is not. The changed circumstances doctrine requires
a court to evaluate the relevant factual circumstances (from the record or by
judicial notice75) and their relation to a fixed constitutional principle to
determine whether that principle was violated.76 This analytical approach
utilizes the current standard of constitutional analysis at the time of the
challenge––for example, an economic law must bear a rational relationship
to a legitimate government purpose. The court applies the current standard
to the relevant factual circumstances to establish legitimacy or illegitimacy,
rationality or irrationality.77 The changed circumstances doctrine accounts
for the possibility that the relevant factual circumstances could change in
such a way as to cause a constitutional law to cross into unconstitutionality.
This is distinct from living constitutionalism, which presumes that
constitutional rules can change in response to changes in the relevant
factual or societal circumstances.78 Some Supreme Court decisions have
used changed or changing circumstances––as evidenced by social values,79
sociological data,80 or foreign and international law81––as justifications for
creating or altering existing constitutional rules.82 That is not the approach
that is described or advocated here.83 While those same considerations
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492 (Fla. 1970); Georgia S. & Fla. R.R. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Se. Ga., 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965);
Wegan v. Village of Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273 (Minn. 1981); Caruso v. Aluminum Co. of America,
473 N.E.2d 818 (Ohio 1984).
75
See Larsen, supra note 19, at 72.
76
See id. at 60–61; see also Williamson, supra note 19, at 604–05.
77
See Larsen, supra note 19, at 70–76, for an interesting discussion on the role of facts in
judicial review. See also DONALD FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS (2008).
78
See Larsen, supra note 19, at 60–61.
79
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (citing shifting attitudes toward homosexuality
as justification for overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which upheld anti-sodomy
laws). Hinging constitutional rules on abstract social concepts can be problematic: such concepts are
difficult, if not impossible, to define with any certainty and can change very quickly. See Williamson,
supra note 19, at 604–05.
80
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (citing sociological studies about the impacts
of “separate but equal” education policies on black children as justification for overruling Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
81
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (using international law to bolster arguments that
the death penalty for seventeen-year-olds violated the Eighth Amendment and overruling Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 576 (“[T]he reasoning and
holding in Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. . . . Other nations . . . have taken action consistent with
an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.”).
82
See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1–6 (2010).
83
This is by no means to suggest that the results of the cases cited supra notes 79–81 were
incorrect or that the living Constitution method of analysis is unprincipled or wrong. Cases that utilize
this approach are simply irrelevant to the changed circumstances doctrine and beyond the scope of this
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could be relevant in a changed circumstances analysis, lower courts are not
at liberty to disturb binding Supreme Court constitutional precedent or
define new expansions or limitations of constitutional rights.84 The only
objective of the changed circumstances doctrine is to determine the
constitutionality of the regulation at issue, within the existing constitutional
precedential framework, but in light of the relevant factual circumstances
that exist at the time the regulation is challenged.
Under the changed circumstances doctrine, a law’s “shelf life” can be
reached in one of two ways: the factual circumstances underlying the
government’s interests are temporary and cease to exist, or changes in
factual circumstances sever the relationship between the government’s
interests and the means used to further them.85 In most rational basis review
changed circumstances cases, it is generally the second part of this inquiry
that is in dispute. With respect to economic regulation, the government
virtually always asserts an interest in protecting the public health, safety,
and welfare.86 Articulated generally, these are enduring state objectives that
are unlikely to disappear over time and will always be considered a
legitimate government interest.87 Thus, the question most open for
challenge in economic changed circumstances cases is whether––in light of
the factual circumstances that exist at the time of the challenge––the law is
still rationally related to protecting the public health, safety, and welfare.
The Changed Circumstances Doctrine and Rational Basis Review
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Y K
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comment. For more on the complex and fascinating debate about living constitutionalism versus
originalism, see, for example, ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 3–48 (1997); STRAUSS, supra note 82; Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the
Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549 (2009); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed
Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995).
84
Also beyond the scope of this Comment is a discussion of the tension between stare decisis
and the originalist interpretative method. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
854–63 (1992); Nelson Lund, Stare Decisis and Originalism: Judicial Disengagement from the Supreme
Court’s Errors, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1029 (2012). This Comment presumes, for the purposes of the
changed circumstances doctrine, that existing constitutional rules and principles are valid and binding.
85
See Williamson, supra note 19, at 606.
86
See generally Florman, supra note 1; Neily, supra note 1; Sandefur, Equality of Opportunity,
supra note 1.
87
See generally id.
88
See Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547–48 (1924) (“A law depending upon the
existence of an emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 113 Side B

The changed circumstances doctrine has been a part of the Supreme
Court’s rational basis review jurisprudence since the early twentieth
century. Justice Holmes recognized that unforeseen changes in the facts
justifying a law might require its invalidation, even if it was valid when
enacted.88 Other Justices echoed this principle. “[A] police regulation,
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although valid when made,” Justice Hughes explained, “may become, by
reason of later events, arbitrary and confiscatory in operation.”89 And
Justice Brandeis stated, “A statute valid as to one set of facts may be invalid
as to another. A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change
in the conditions to which it applied.”90
One of the clearest expressions of the changed circumstances doctrine
comes from one of the most important economic cases in Supreme Court
jurisprudence.91 In addition to setting the stage for tiered scrutiny and
establishing the strong presumption of constitutionality for economic
regulation, Carolene confirmed the Court’s previous declarations that a
rational law could become irrational over time.92 The Court explained that
when a statute is justified by specific factual circumstances, it could be
found unconstitutional once those factual circumstances no longer exist.93
The Carolene Court reviewed a conviction under the Filled Milk Act,
a federal law that prohibited the interstate sale of milk with added vegetable
or coconut oils.94 Noting that the law could be upheld “wholly on the
presumption of constitutionality,” the Court nevertheless reviewed the
evidence provided by the government to support its prohibition.95 The
government contended that filled milk was “generally injurious to the
public health and facilitated fraud upon the public” because it did not have
the same levels of vitamins found in whole milk products.96 Therefore,
according to the government, there was a substantial risk that children
might be fed the filled milk and deprived of nutrients essential to growth
and development.97 The Filled Milk Act was easily upheld.
Carolene is much more well-known for its footnote than its subsequent
history.98 After two losses at the Supreme Court, the Carolene Products
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emergency ceases or the facts change even though valid when passed.”). In Chastleton, the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a temporary, emergency rent control statute in the District of
Columbia. When the legislature reenacted the law based only on a legislative finding that the emergency
conditions were still present, Holmes declined to accept the government’s “prophecy” and remanded for
fact-finding on whether the emergency conditions still existed. Six months later, a lower court declared
that the emergency had ended and invalidated the statute. See Peck v. Fink, 2 F.2d 912 (D.D.C. 1924).
89
Abie State Bank v. Weaver 282 U.S. 765, 772 (1931).
90
Nashville, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 415 (1935) (footnote omitted).
91
See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text.
92 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938); see also Milnot Co. v.
Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1972).
93
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153. The Court cited Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair, 264
U.S. 543 (1924), to support the proposition. See supra note 88.
94
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 146–47.
95
Id. at 148–49, 49 n.2.
96
Id. at 149 n.2, 150 n.3.
97
Id.
98 See generally Gilman, supra note 49; Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products,
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1987 S. CT. REV. 397 (1987).
99
Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221, 222–23 (S.D. Ill. 1972).
100
Id. at 221.
101
Id. at 224.
102
Carolene, 304 U.S. 144, 149 n.2, 150 n.3.
103
Milnot, 350 F. Supp. at 222–23.
104
Id. at 224 (“[T]he dairy market conditions and dangers of confusion which led to the passage
and judicial upholding of the Filled Milk Act many years ago . . . have long since ceased to exist.”). The
court relied on Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair, which is the case that the Carolene Court relied on
for the same proposition. Id.; see also Carolene, 304 U.S. at 153; Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair,
264 U.S. 543, 547–48 (1924).
105
Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2009).
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1184.
108
Id.
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Company changed its name to the Milnot Company and continued to sell
filled milk on an intrastate basis in the states where it was produced, so as
to avoid prosecution under the Filled Milk Act.99 Twenty-eight years later,
Milnot waged one more constitutional attack against the Filled Milk Act in
federal district court.100 Milnot produced evidence that since 1944, a variety
of imitation milk and dairy products––functionally indistinct from the
product sold by Milnot––had emerged on the market, and the government
permitted their distribution in interstate commerce.101 The government had
contended in Carolene that prohibiting the sale of filled milk was targeted
at correcting a very specific evil––preventing malnutrition in children from
consuming nutritionally inferior imitation dairy products.102 Milnot now
argued that the broad availability of those products at the time of the
challenge severed any rational connection between preventing malnutrition
in children and prohibiting Milnot’s products.103 The court agreed that the
government’s continued enforcement of the Filled Milk Act against Milnot
was irrational.104
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also recognized the viability of the
changed circumstances doctrine in reversing the dismissal of a substantive
due process challenge to the city of Denver’s pit bull ban.105 The plaintiffs
conceded that the city of Denver possessed a legitimate interest in animal
control as a means to preserve the health and safety of the public, but
maintained that the city’s chosen means––a pit bull ban enacted twenty
years earlier––was no longer rationally related to achieving that interest.106
The challengers presented evidence from breeding standards that the
prohibited dog breeds made excellent family pets and were not significantly
more dangerous than many other non-prohibited breeds.107 The district
court had granted the city’s motion to dismiss, citing older case law from
other jurisdictions that upheld similar bans.108 The Tenth Circuit reversed,
emphasizing that the plaintiff’s specific argument was that “although pit
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Id. at 1183.
Santos v. City of Hous., 80 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
Id. at 602.
Id. at 608.
Id.
See infra note 232.
Santos, 80 F. Supp. at 608.
Id. at 608–09.
Brown v. Barry, 710 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1989).
Id. at 352.
Id. 352–53.
Id. at 355.
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bull bans sustained twenty years ago may have been justified by the thenexisting body of knowledge, the state of science in 2009 is such that the
bans are no longer rational.”109
One court utilized the changed circumstances doctrine to ferret out an
original, illegitimate purpose of a statute. In Santos v. City of Houston, the
plaintiff challenged a seventy-year-old Houston ordinance that banned
private vans (jitneys) carrying fifteen people or more on public streets.110
Since the ban’s enactment, a number of virtually identical services had
begun to operate in the city––van pools, ride sharing services, air transport
vans, and the like.111 The government contended that the jitney ban served
current objectives of safety and unimpeded traffic flow, an argument that
the court found unavailing in light of the many similar vehicles that could
freely operate on public streets.112 After dismissing as irrational the offered
justifications for furthering legitimate purposes, the court examined
evidence of the original motivation behind the ban––to eliminate
competition against the streetcar industry.113 Such a purpose is not only
arguably illegitimate,114 but also irrelevant, since streetcars had long ceased
to operate on Houston’s streets.115 “[E]ven if the ordinance ever had a
purpose, legitimate or not,” the court said, “its utility has passed.”116
The changed circumstances doctrine is almost necessary when a statute
is so old that it is not even possible to find any evidence of its original
purpose. In Brown v. Barry, a “shoeshine entrepreneur” began providing
showers, training, shoeshine kits, and employment to homeless persons in
the District of Columbia.117 He operated successfully and without incident
for several years under a general vendor permit.118 In a sudden change of
course, the District revoked his permit for violating an eighty-three-year-old
municipal ordinance, which provided that “no permit shall be issued for a
bootblack [shoeshine] stand on public space.”119 Unable to produce any
relevant legislative history for the ordinance, the government speculated
that the ban could have been intended to reduce litter or prevent
impediments to sidewalk pedestrian traffic.120 The court found these
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Id.
Id.
123 Id. at 356.
124 See Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S.
129 (1968).
125
Id. at 131.
126
Id. at 135.
127
Id. at 136.
128
Id. at 133–34.
129
Id. at 138.
130
Id.
122
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justifications unavailing since there was no evidence that the shoeshines
took up more space than larger, permitted vendors such as fruit stands.121
The court noted that “the District has not articulated the belief that there is a
continuing validity or life to this regulation in the present context.”122 Given
the lack of any articulable rational basis for distinguishing shoeshines from
other vendors, the court found the ordinance unconstitutional.123
The Supreme Court has not always been receptive to constitutional
challenges based on changed circumstances. In Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad, the
Court reviewed “full-crew laws,” which dictated the size and personnel
makeup of train crews.124 The Court had upheld the law against challenges
when they were first enacted at the beginning of the century, but almost
fifty years later, a changed circumstances argument was brought to the
table.125 The challengers presented considerable evidence that technological
advancements and the increasing obsolescence of certain railroad jobs
meant that the old laws overestimated the crew size necessary to operate the
trains.126
The plaintiffs prevailed in the district court, but the Supreme Court did
not accept their changed circumstances arguments. The Court noted that the
evidence regarding the need for full crews was still mixed or inconclusive
and railroad laws had been the subject of disputes and “legislative reevaluation” for many years.127 In light of this ongoing political conflict and
inconclusive evidence, the Court said, it was inappropriate for the judiciary
to intervene and deem the laws outdated.128 The district court’s findings of
fact regarding the law’s obsolescence, according to the Court, was an
improper usurpation of democratic judgment.129 Resolution of ongoing
political conflicts, the Court said, may be “fixed only by the people acting
through their elected representatives.”130
It is important to note that although the Court explicitly rejected the
plaintiff’s changed circumstances argument in this particular case, the Court
did not overrule its earlier changed circumstances cases or indicate that
constitutional inquiries must only be limited to the factual circumstances
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Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1982).
Id. 900–01.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 912 n.27.
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981).
Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
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that existed at the time of enactment. Thus, Brotherhood might best be
viewed as discouraging—but not precluding––the changed circumstances
doctrine as defined in Carolene.
Although Carolene’s rule regarding changed circumstances was
unambiguous, lower courts have been led astray by other language in
Carolene’s more general discussion about judicial deference to legislative
judgment, as well as later, inapposite Supreme Court rational basis review
cases. Practical concerns, such as institutional costs and the limited
competency of courts to ascertain and weigh facts, have also played a role
in some courts’ abandonment of the changed circumstances doctrine.
In Murillo v. Bambrick, the Third Circuit held that New Jersey’s
imposition of trial fees upon individuals undergoing divorces, but not on
other civil litigants, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.131 The
divorce trial fees had originally served to offset the costs of the special
masters used in divorce proceedings. After the special master requirement
was abolished and the stated adopted no-fault divorce, the challengers
argued that the fees lost any rational relationship to offsetting the costs of
divorce proceedings.132 The court conducted a standard rational basis
review analysis and upheld the statute.133
The court declined to adopt a changed circumstances analysis because,
it said, “the Supreme Court appears not to have determined definitively
whether changed conditions are a relevant consideration.”134 The Murillo
court compared the changed circumstances language from Carolene with
language from two of the Supreme Court’s rational basis review cases. In
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, the Court declared, “Where there was
evidence before the legislature reasonably supporting the classification,
litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering
evidence that the legislature was mistaken.”135 And in Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., the Court said that “if any state of facts reasonably can
be conceived that would sustain [a statute], the existence of that state of
facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.”136 The Third
Circuit interpreted these two statements to preclude a changed
circumstances constitutional analysis, but conceded that “[t]here may be a
role for the courts to play when a statute, rendered manifestly unreasonable
by changed conditions, remains in effect for many years without legislative
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Id. at 912.
Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 911 (3d Cir. 1982).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 62–64 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 220 (2014).
143 Id.
144 See Heffner v. Murphy, 866 F. Supp. 2d 358, 429 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (“[W]e admonish the
[Funeral Board] to apply appropriate focus and craft, or clarify, regulations that appropriately govern the
funeral industry in this, the twenty-first century.”).
145 Heffner, 745 F.3d at 62.
146 Id. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Heffner v. Murphy, declining to clarify whether
rational basis review requires a court to evaluate the rationality of a law’s enforcement under current
factual circumstances, or only the factual circumstances that existed at the time the law was enacted—no
matter how long ago the law was enacted or how much the factual circumstances have changed since its
enactment. See Heffner v. Murphy, 135 S. Ct. 220 (2014) (denying writ of certiorari); Heffner v.
Murphy Petition, supra note 17, at *1.
138
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actions.”137
The Murillo court also gave a non-legal justification for abandoning
the changed circumstances doctrine. It was concerned about institutional
costs that the changed circumstances doctrine could impose on the
government.138 By invalidating laws that were valid when originally
enacted, but grounded on assumptions that were later found incorrect, the
courts would be effectively imposing an affirmative obligation on the
legislature.139 To avoid the judicial intervention and invalidation of laws,
the legislature would have to “constantly reassess the continuing validity of
the factual premises underlying each piece of legislation enacted over the
years” in order to discover and correct the alleged error.140 In the present
case, the court noted, only nine years had passed from the time the statute
was enacted and the time of the challenge, which provided little opportunity
for the legislature to complete such a process.141
The Third Circuit recently confirmed its renouncement of the changed
circumstances doctrine in a challenge to Pennsylvania’s funeral industry
regulations, which date back to 1952.142 In Heffner v. Murphy, the plaintiffs
sought to invalidate of a number of arcane laws, including a requirement
that all funeral homes maintain preparation rooms, and a prohibition on
serving food and drinks in funeral homes.143 The district court held that
some of the regulations were outdated, irrational, and now appeared to
serve only economically protectionist purposes.144 The Third Circuit
reversed, rejecting the lower court’s consideration of changed
circumstances.145 Citing the highly deferential nature of rational basis
review, the Third Circuit declared that although “certain provisions of
[Pennsylvania’s funeral industry law] are antiquated in light of how funeral
homes now operate[,] . . . [t]hat is not . . . a constitutional flaw.”146
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Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Reg., 763 F.2d 1106, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1109.
149
Id. at 1110.
150
Id. at 1109.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 1111.
153
Id. at 1111 n.3 (“In construing statutory language, a court must ordinarily consider the
circumstances at the time of passage, rather than later interpretations or statements of purpose. Where
courts have invalidated archaic statutes, there is often an independent constitutional basis for doing so
(i.e., a belated recognition that the statutes were unconstitutional as written).”) (citations omitted).
154
Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
155
Id. at 422.
148
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The Ninth Circuit also considered the impact of changed
circumstances on a Minnesota railroad regulation.147 In 1985, the
Burlington Railroad Corporation challenged a turn of the century statute
that compelled railroads to maintain station houses and staff in any town
with a population of one thousand or more.148 The court defined the
legitimate purpose of the statute as fostering “public convenience and
necessity” by ensuring that towns received a minimum level of service.149
The railroad argued that the regulation no longer rationally served that
interest because many of the duties that had been historically performed by
service agents were now computerized and conducted in centralized service
centers. Furthermore, Burlington argued, changes in freight practices meant
that some of the smaller stations rarely handled any freight at all and did not
need the same level of staffing as others.150 The court conducted a standard
rational basis review analysis and held that, since the population
requirements had been updated only sixteen years prior to the challenge, the
railroad had not shown that circumstances had changed so drastically that
the statute no longer possessed a rational basis.151
Citing Carolene, Lindsley, and Clover Leaf, the Ninth Circuit
described the Supreme Court as being “ambivalent” about whether changed
circumstances could transform a once-rational statute into an irrational
law.152 Nevertheless, the court took it upon itself to declare that the time of
a classification’s creation is the appropriate contextual reference point for
the purposes of an equal protection rational basis review analysis.153
The District Court of the Southern District of New York recently
followed the leads of Murillo and Burlington in rejecting the changed
circumstances doctrine. In Jones v. Schneiderman, the court evaluated New
York State’s prohibition of mixed martial arts (MMA) fighting under both
equal protection and due process.154 New York banned MMA fighting in
1996 on the grounds that it posed significant health and safety risks to the
competitors and negatively influenced the public morality and youths of
New York.155 The plaintiffs argued that significant changes in the rules and
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Id. at 423–24.
New York, which had long been the only state that prohibited MMA, recently lifted the ban.
See Damon Martin, New York Legalizes MMA After Nearly 20-Year Ban on the Sport, FOX SPORTS
(May 22, 2016, 6:30 PM), www.foxsports.com/ufc/story/ufc-new-york-legalizes-mma-after-nearly-20year-ban-on-the-sport-032216.
158
Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d at 425.
159
See, e.g., United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Moore, 644 F.3d
553 (7th Cir. 2011).
160
Then, 56 F.3d at 466. The majority expressly disavowed Calabresi’s concurrence, which
recognized the changed circumstances doctrine.
161
Id. at 468 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
157

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 117 Side B

administration of professional MMA fighting turned a once violent,
“anything goes” sport into something far safer and more appropriate for a
broader mainstream audience.156 At the time of the lawsuit, the athletic
commissions of forty-five other states had officially sanctioned MMA
fighting, which the plaintiffs argued was proof that the sport was far safer
and no longer posed substantial threats to the public welfare.157 The court
cited to Clover Leaf and held that the prohibition of MMA was both rational
at the time it was adopted and rational at the time that it was enforced,
despite the substantial discrepancies in the factual circumstances between
the two.158
Outside of the substantive due process and equal protection context,
but still within rational basis review, some litigants have invoked the
changed circumstances doctrine to challenge federal criminal drug
sentences, alleging that new evidence proves that the justifications
underlying the laws were incorrect. Criminal defendants have asserted––so
far with no success––equal protection challenges to the federal mandatory
minimum sentences under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which punish crack
cocaine offenses 100 times more severely than powder cocaine offenses.159
The Second and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals both considered
changed circumstances arguments against the mandatory minimum crack
offense sentences, but declined to use changed circumstances as a reason to
invalidate the laws. In United States v. Then, the Second Circuit rejected a
defendant’s equal protection challenge to his crack conviction sentence and
declined to consider the changed circumstances doctrine.160 In a
concurrence, Judge Calabresi grappled with the relevance of considerable
emerging research that showed crack did not pose a substantially greater
threat than cocaine to users or to society, as well as evidence of its
profoundly disparate impact on minorities.161 Although Calabresi did not
believe that the evidence at the time compelled the finding of an equal
protection violation, he noted that if the evidence continued to develop,
“constitutional arguments that were unavailing in the past may not be
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foreclosed in the future.”162 Calabresi cautioned, however, against
“courts . . . step[ping] in [to] say that what was rational in the past has been
made irrational by the passage of time, change of circumstances, or the
availability of new knowledge.”163 Accounting for changed circumstances,
Calabresi suggested, could lead to “hazardous” line-drawing in judicial
decisions that should remain in the purview of the legislature.164
Since Then, few courts have embraced Calabresi’s prediction.165
Almost twenty years later, in United States v. Moore, the Seventh Circuit
noted that the challenger’s evidence––a series of Sentencing Commission
reports––indeed undermined many of Congress’s prior assumptions that
crack cocaine was more addictive, more harmful, and caused more violence
than cocaine in the powder form.166 However, the same reports also
contained findings indicating that crack was still at least somewhat more
dangerous than powder cocaine.167 Citing again to Carolene, the court
determined that the factual evidence about crack and cocaine sentencing
remains “at least debatable,” and the ultimate determination must be left to
Congress.168 Although the court rejected Moore’s arguments, it
acknowledged that a challenge based on changed circumstances could be a
legitimate avenue for a constitutional attack.169
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162
Id. at 467. Calabresi noted two relevant sources of changing factual evidence. First, the
Sentencing Commission had conducted an investigation and found little evidence that crack was
substantially more dangerous than cocaine. It also recommended that Congress eliminate the differential
treatment of crack and cocaine. Second, statistical research revealed that the sentencing ratio disparately
impacted minorities, who comprised the majority of crack users and distributors. Id. at 467–68.
163
Id. at 468.
164
Id. at 466–69. Calabresi also noted some interesting international comparisons to changed
circumstances, and suggested that even if American courts do not immediately invalidate laws on the
basis of changed circumstances, they might be able to provide notice when a statute or regulation
appears to be approaching unconstitutionality. In Germany, for example, the Constitutional Court does
not immediately strike down an outdated law that appears to be unconstitutional. Instead, it declares that
the law is approaching unconstitutionality because of changed circumstances. This serves to put
parliament on notice and allow time for review and reconsideration of the legislation before the Court
completely nullifies it. Id.
165
See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 644 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2011). But see Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 96–97 (2008) (Under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a sentencing
judge was permitted to deviate from 100-1 sentencing guidelines based on a “need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities.”).
166
Id. at 556–57.
167
Id. at 557.
168
Id. at 556.
169
Id. More recently, plaintiffs have begun to wage challenges against the federal government’s
classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug, citing Carolene and presenting evidence to disprove
Congress’s finding from forty-five years ago that marijuana possesses no medicinal benefit. See Larsen,
supra note 19, at 96. In addition to presenting new facts about current scientific understandings of
marijuana’s effects on the body and medical usefulness, litigants have also argued that the federal
government’s purpose is greatly diminished as states begin to legalize the drug. Id.

37901-fiu_11-2 Sheet No. 118 Side B

06/27/2016 12:34:37

11 - TALCOTT_FINAL_6.26.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

518

FIU Law Review

6/26/16 8:32 PM

[Vol. 11:495

The Changed Circumstances Doctrine Beyond Rational Basis Review

170

C M
Y K

06/27/2016 12:34:37

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341–42 (2003) (“We are mindful . . . that ‘[a] core purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on
race.’ Accordingly, race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time.”) (citations omitted).
171
Id. at 343 (“It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to further
an interest in student body diversity in the context of public higher education. Since that time, the
number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed increased. We expect that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved
today.”). The Court stressed the delicate balance between the government’s interest and the means
employed in the admissions policy, noting that “racial classifications, however compelling their goals,
are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands.” Id.
at 342. This suggests that even minor shifts in factual circumstances could impact constitutionality.
172
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 530–35 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
173
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 243, 259–60 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
174
See TJS of New York, Inc. v. Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2010).
175
Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 505.
176
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 398 U.S. 367 (1969).
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In equal protection cases involving heightened levels of scrutiny, the
Supreme Court routinely considers the impact of changed circumstances on
the constitutionality of laws. In evaluating a race-conscious admissions
policy in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that
there would be some future point at which the policy would no longer pass
constitutional muster.170 If race-conscious admissions policies are
successful in furthering the compelling interest of increasing diversity in
higher education, it logically follows that diversity will eventually,
hopefully, reach some intended or desirable level. When it does, the same
policies would no longer be necessary for furthering the same purpose and
would no longer be able to survive the strict scrutiny standard.171
The First Amendment has also proven fertile ground for challengers to
allege unconstitutionality on the basis of changed factual circumstances.
The changed circumstances doctrine has not served as an analytical tool in
any of the Supreme Court’s majority opinions; however, the significance of
factual change over time was squarely addressed by Justice Thomas, who
recently discussed the issue in a dissent172 and concurrence.173 Changed
circumstances were also integral in a First Amendment decision from the
Second Circuit.174
In FCC v. Fox Television, the Court heard a challenge regarding
agency regulations from the Federal Communication Commission (FCC).175
In the 1950s, the FCC promulgated various regulations in furtherance of the
“fairness doctrine,” requiring broadcasters to provide equivalent on-air
exposure for political candidates and allow for equal discussion from all
sides of a political or public issue.176 The Supreme Court upheld the
regulations against a First Amendment challenge in Red Lion Broadcasting
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Id. at 376.
Larsen, supra note 19, at 89.
179
See, e.g., Brief of Respondents NBC Universal, Inc. et al. at 32–38, FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 3153438, at *32–38; Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 14–20, Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 134 S. Ct. 2874 (2014) (No. 13-1124),
2014 WL 1090035, at *14–20; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 16–23, Media Gen., Inc. v. FCC, 133 S.
Ct. 63 (2011) (No. 11-691), 2011 WL 6069620, at *16–23; see also Thomas W. Hazlett et al., The
Overly Active Corpse of Red Lion, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 51, 53 (2010).
180
Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 530 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Constitutional rights are enshrined
with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future
legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.”) (quoting Dist. of Colum. v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)) .
181
Id. at 533.
182
Id. at 534 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–63 (1992)).
183
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 243, 259–60 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
184
Id. at 239–40.
178
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v. FCC, citing the scarcity of the broadcast spectrum and the need for the
government to “control . . . the cacophony of competing voices” as
warranting the intrusion on free speech and expression.177 Since that time,
the FCC has invoked spectrum scarcity to justify a wide array of broadcast
regulations well beyond the fairness doctrine.178 Basing a constitutional rule
on the nature of a broadcast medium practically invites challenges based on
changed circumstances. Litigants have raised several challenges citing the
anachronism of the spectrum scarcity rationale but the Court has yet to
overrule Red Lion.179
Fox Television was not decided on constitutional grounds, but in his
dissent, Justice Thomas expressed strong disagreement with Red Lion’s use
of a “set of transitory facts” to define the lenient First Amendment
protections for broadcasters.180 He noted that even if Red Lion applied an
appropriate constitutional standard, the factual assumptions underlying the
rule had been “eviscerated” by tremendous technological advances that had
since developed.181 Television and radio are now supplemented by
seemingly endless options over cable, satellite, and the internet. “These
dramatic changes in factual circumstances,” Thomas said, “might well
support a departure from precedent under the prevailing approach to stare
decisis.”182
Justice Thomas also considered changed circumstances in his
concurrence in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.183 The majority opinion
invalidated a federal prohibition on “virtual child pornography,” which is
sexually explicit material that appears to depict minors, but is produced
using youthful looking adults or computer generated imagery, rather than
actual children.184 Justice Thomas agreed that the ban could not be
sustained under the First Amendment, but found one of the government’s
arguments persuasive: Without the ban, people who possess and distributed
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Id. at 259.
Id.
187
Id.
188
See generally Peter T. Cavallaro, Beneath Oceans, Airstrips, and Sports Stadiums: Negative
Solution to the “Alternative Avenues” Time Frame Debate, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 487 (2013).
189
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46–48 (1986).
190
Id. at 50.
191
TJS of New York, Inc. v. Smithtown, 598 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 2010).
192
Id. at 22.
193
Id. at 19.
194
Id. at 20. There had been ongoing First Amendment litigation with the previous owners of the
location. Id.
186
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actual pornographic depictions of children might be able to evade
prosecution by claiming that the depictions are computer generated.185 At
the time, there was no evidence that this had ever occurred and computer
generated images of children were still readily distinguishable from the real
thing.186 Thomas speculated, however, that if technology ever evolved to a
point where it became impossible to distinguish virtual from actual child
pornography, the government’s interests in ensuring successful prosecution
of child pornographers might justify a future restriction on virtual child
pornography.187 Thomas suggested the inverse of the typical changed
circumstances case––that an unconstitutional government action could
eventually cross the threshold into constitutionality.
Another First Amendment doctrine susceptible to the effects of
changed factual circumstances is the one governing the regulation of adultoriented businesses.188 Under City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, local
governments may enact zoning ordinances that restrict the locations of adult
businesses in order to protect the public against detrimental “secondary
effects” (e.g., drug use, crime, and prostitution), but not as a way to
suppress that form of expression.189 Thus, if these substantial interests are
served, the ordinance will comport with the First Amendment as long as it
“allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.”190 In adultoriented business cases, the reasonable alternative avenues inquiry typically
entails an assessment of other locations in the town where an adult-oriented
business could be located.191
In TJS of New York v. Smithtown, the government argued that an
ordinance should be deemed constitutionally valid as long as it provided
reasonable alternative avenues at the time of enactment, rather than at the
time of the challenge.192 In 2002, TJS purchased an existing adult
entertainment store on a location that was grandfathered under a 1994
ordinance that would have otherwise prohibited it.193 TJS continued to
operate an adult business at the location and the town sought an order of
closure.194 The Second Circuit, led by Judge Calabresi, held that courts
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must consider the adequacy of alternative avenues at the time the ordinance
is challenged, not at the time the ordinance was enacted.195 Judge Calabresi
warned what could result from a contrary interpretation:
If the only relevant question were whether an ordinance provided
adequate alternatives on the day of its passage, any law that did so
would thereafter be immune from First Amendment challenge. And
speech that the Supreme Court has held to be protected by that
Amendment would be silenced.196
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195
Id. at 22–23; see also Cnty. of DuPage v. Lake St. Spa, Inc., 916 N.E.2d 1240 (Ill. App. Ct.
2009). The court noted that its holding could be in conflict with two other cases, but maintained that it
had reached the proper result. Id. at 25; see also Daytona Grand, Inc. v. Daytona Beach, 490 F.3d 860
(11th Cir. 2007); Bigg Wolf Discount Video Movie Sales, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., 256 F. Supp. 2d
385 (D. Md. 2003).
196
TJS of New York, 598 F.3d at 26.
197
See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
198
Oral Argument at 38:41, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96),
www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-96.
199
See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2624–31.
200
Id. at 2619–20.
201
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966).
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This case in particular illustrates how the changed circumstances doctrine
enables the courts to preserve individual rights in perpetuity. Without it,
constitutional rights could be essentially limited in time by factual
conditions that no longer exist.
The final case in this section, Shelby County v. Holder, is the Supreme
Court’s most recent and clearest articulation of the changed circumstances
doctrine.197 It does not fit neatly with any of the other changed
circumstances cases discussed above––it is the only Fifteenth Amendment
case and the standard of review the Court employed is debatable. But it
makes it abundantly clear that the Court views constitutional analysis to
require consideration of the contextual facts and circumstances that exist
when the law is challenged, not those that existed when the law was
enacted.
Justice Kennedy was perhaps stating the obvious when he said during
the Shelby County oral arguments, “[T]imes change.” 198 But that simple
proposition became the Court’s primary justification for striking down the
preclearance coverage requirement in the Voting Rights Act of 1965.199 The
provision at issue was a formula used to determine which states and
counties were “covered” jurisdictions required to obtain approval from the
federal government before passing voting laws.200 The Court had upheld the
provision shortly after enactment.201
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The “extraordinary”202 measures, drafted to expire after five years,
were enacted to combat blatant and widespread minority voter
disenfranchisement throughout the South.203 Over forty years later, they
remained in place and had become even more stringent.204 But the objective
facts demonstrated that the minority voting rates had significantly improved
over time, minority representation in political offices increased, and that the
states no longer engaged in the improper practices that the law was intended
to prevent.205 Because it was based on “decades-old data” and “eradicated
practices,” the Court found that the law simply no longer made sense in
light of existing conditions.206 “Current burdens,” the Court declared, “must
be justified by current needs.”207
The Court’s terminology suggests that it was applying rational basis
review, which was the standard the Court used to uphold the law in 1966.208
But the opinion clearly did not exhibit the level of legislative deference that
is characteristic of rational basis review.209 This could suggest that the
Court is willing to scrutinize the rationality of a law a little more carefully
when it is particularly old and outdated.
The Court’s holding, though deemed virtually catastrophic by the
media,210 was in fact rather modest.211 By relying only on the changed

06/27/2016 12:34:37
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202
Although the provision contravened fundamental principles of federalism, the measures were
deemed necessary to address entrenched racial discrimination in voting. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618.
203
Id. at 2620.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 2628–29.
206
Id. at 2630.
207
Id. (quotations omitted).
208 See id. at 2629 (“Viewing the preclearance requirements as targeting [second-generational
barriers] simply highlights the irrationality of continued reliance on the § 4 coverage formula . . . .”); id.
at 2630–31 (“It would have been irrational for Congress to distinguish between States in such a
fundamental way based on 40-year-old data, when today’s statistics tell an entirely different story. And
it would have been irrational to base coverage on the use of voting tests 40 years ago, when such tests
have been illegal since that time. But that is exactly what Congress has done.”); Id. at 2625 (“We
therefore concluded that ‘the coverage formula [was] rational in both practice and theory.’”) (quoting
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966)).
209
See Larsen, supra note 19, at 111 (“This isn’t your mother’s rationality review.”).
210
See, e.g., Dana Liebelson, The Supreme Court Gutted the Voting Rights Act. What Happened
Next in These 8 States Will Not Shock You, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 8, 2014, 6:00 AM),
www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/republican-voting-rights-supreme-court-id; Adam Liptak, Supreme
Court Invalidates Key Part of Voting Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013), www.nytimes.com/
2013/06/26/us/supreme-court-ruling.html?_r=0.
211 NATHANIEL PERSILY & THOMAS MANN, BROOKINGS INST., SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER AND
THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 5 (Aug. 2013), www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/
papers/2013/08/09-shelby-v-holder-policy-mann/persily_mann_shelby-county-v-holder-policy-brief_v9.pdf.
The Court evaluated a similar case six years earlier. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder,
557 U.S. 193 (2009). In Northwest Austin, the Court employed constitutional avoidance, resolving the
issue on statutory grounds, but “expressed serious doubts about the Act’s continued constitutionality.”
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2621.
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factual circumstances to find that the preclearance requirement had crossed
from constitutionality to unconstitutionality, the Court left for another day
far more complex issues––namely the scope of Congress’s power under the
Fifteenth Amendment.212 Congress is now limited by Shelby County only
from utilizing the same outdated preclearance formula but not from
enacting law under the Fifteenth Amendment.213 If Congress determines
that some degree of federal oversight is still required for certain
jurisdictions, it may attempt to reconfigure the Voting Rights Act
accordingly.
In addition to clearly demonstrating that the Supreme Court endorses,
at least in one context, a time-of-challenge rather than time-of-enactment
approach in evaluating a law’s constitutionality, Shelby County provides
invaluable guidance from the Supreme Court as to how the changed
circumstances doctrine operates in practice.
PRESERVING THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES DOCTRINE
AND PROTECTING ECONOMIC LIBERTY
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212
See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631; see generally Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the
Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713 (2014).
213
Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
214
Heffner v. Murphy Petition, supra note 17, at *14.
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The Supreme Court’s command in Carolene makes clear that the
constitutionality of a law must be evaluated with regard to the facts that
exist at the time the law is challenged; not the facts that existed when the
law was enacted. This makes sense. If an old law impedes a constitutional
right today, the government should not be able to justify it with the reasons
that only existed long ago. Although this fundamental principle courses
through many areas of constitutional jurisprudence, a number of lower
courts have failed to adhere to it when reviewing challenges within the most
expansive category of constitutional cases––those that apply rational basis
review. The changed circumstances doctrine is, and should remain, a core
principle of rational basis review in all areas of constitutional law. It could
prove particularly beneficial for economic liberty by creating a meaningful
judicial limit on the government’s power to enforce economic regulations
after their utility has passed.
In the seventy-eight years since Carolene, the Court never explicitly
overruled its dictate about changed factual circumstances.214 The Court has
decided a number of rational basis review cases but all have involved
challenges to the constitutionality of recently enacted laws, giving no
opportunity for the Court to rule on the specific question raised by changed
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215
Id. Shelby County could be viewed as an exception to this; however, it does not apply the
standard two-part rational basis review analysis. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
216
Compare Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 62 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 220
(2014), Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. Reg., 763 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1985), Murillo v.
Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898 (3d Cir. 1982), and Jones v. Schneiderman, 888 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y.
2012), with Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir. 2009), Santos v. City of Houston,
80 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Tex. 1994), and Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D. Ill. 1972). See
also discussion supra pages 505–07. Scholars also disagree over whether the changed circumstances
doctrine should apply, and in which types of cases. See Larsen, supra note 19 (arguing that changed
circumstances should only be considered in heightened scrutiny); Ponomarenko, supra note 19 (arguing
that changed circumstances should be considered for substance-based tests, but that they are largely
irrelevant for motives-based tests); Williamson, supra note 19 (arguing that the changed circumstances
doctrine should be extended to equal protection rational basis review cases).
217
See discussion supra pages 518–23.
218
See discussion supra pages 499–506.
219
Id.
220
See discussion supra pages 518–23.
221
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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factual circumstances.215 As a result of a lack of guidance from the Supreme
Court, there is conflict amongst the lower courts over whether the changed
circumstances doctrine is a part of rational basis review.216 There is also
inconsistency between how rational basis review and heightened scrutiny
levels are applied.217 The Supreme Court should clearly reaffirm the
changed circumstances doctrine for rational basis review in order to resolve
these discrepancies. Until it does, the lower courts should employ the
changed circumstances doctrine in rational basis review cases because it is
the correct approach under prevailing Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The primary justification that courts have cited for rejecting the
changed circumstances doctrine is its perceived conflict with the Court’s
other rational basis review cases, which counsel almost unwavering judicial
deference to legislative choices.218 It is understandable, then, that lower
courts would hesitate to step in and invalidate even the most antiquated and
seemingly obsolete laws––especially economic regulations––given the
Court’s strong emphasis on judicial deference and its apparent disinterest in
meaningfully protecting economic liberties.219
Carolene’s principle is consistently reflected throughout the Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence, including rational basis review cases.220 But, as
noted above, all of the Supreme Court’s rational basis review cases since
Carolene involved recent legislative enactments.221 Thus, the Court’s
instructions regarding deference were delivered when there were at least
relatively contemporaneous legislative decisions on the line and the
judiciary risked infringing on the currently acting legislature. This concern
declines significantly when the legislative decisions were made by a
legislature long ago and based on the factual circumstances relevant to the
legislative action at that time. Principles of judicial deference instruct courts
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See discussion supra pages 513–15.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
See discussion supra pages 499–506.
Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 911 (3d Cir. 1982).
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to respect the role and judgment of the legislature, but not to turn a blind
eye to an irrational law that no longer has factual grounding in the modern
world.
What this means is that reliance on some of the Court’s more recent
rational basis review jurisprudence is misplaced. For example, the courts in
Murillo, Burlington, and Schneiderman all relied on Clover Leaf Creamery
to support their rejections of the changed circumstances doctrine.222 In
Clover Leaf Creamery, however, the Supreme Court’s primary concern was
that the evidence and research underlying the legislation at issue was––
citing Carolene––“at least debatable.”223 Rational basis review
jurisprudence has been clear that in such cases the courts must exercise
restraint and defer to the legislature’s choices.224 But the changed
circumstances doctrine may not apply when the rationality of a law is still
genuinely debatable. A changed circumstances argument specifically asserts
that, even though the law had a rational basis when first enacted, under
current facts and circumstances, no rational basis remains––the law’s
rationality is no longer debatable.
Constitutional laws do not necessarily remain constitutional forever.
Those whose rights are impeded by outdated laws must be able to seek
recourse from the judiciary when such laws become unconstitutional.
Completely eliminating the changed circumstances doctrine could lead to
absurd results: An outdated law that would be found unconstitutional if
enacted today could nonetheless be lawfully enforced simply because it was
constitutional at the time of its passage. This cannot be a reasonable
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.
Widespread application of the changed circumstances doctrine, on the other
hand, would help to promote consistency and predictability because
challenged regulations would be evaluated in every case with regard to the
contemporaneous factual circumstances.
Non-legal arguments against the changed circumstances doctrine are
also unavailing. For example, the Murillo court’s concerns about imposing
high institutional costs on the legislature are a straw man. The court
assumes that, if the changed circumstances doctrine were commonplace, the
legislature’s most likely response would be to undertake “painstaking
effort[s]” to review and update old laws in order to avoid judicial
intervention.225 But that is unlikely. Changed circumstances challenges can
only be successfully waged against outdated laws that continue to be
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226 See generally TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY (2014); Barnett, supra note 1; Foley,
supra note 1; James W. Ely, Jr., Economic Liberties and the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 45
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 673 (2008); Neily, supra note 1; Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a Living,
supra note 1.
227 See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN AND ROBERT D. TOLLISON, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC
CHOICE (1972); Randy E. Barnett, Does the Constitution Protect Economic Liberty?, 35 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 5 (2012); Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM.
ECON. REV. 291, 291–303 (1974); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Occupational
Licensing, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 216–22 (2016); Raynor, supra note 1; Steven M. Simpson,
Judicial Abdication and the Rise of Special Interests, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 176–77 (2003); Brief for
Todd J. Zywicki, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees, St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712
F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-30756), 2011 WL 6779085.
228
See supra pages 505–06.
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enforced after becoming irrational. Thus, the proportion of laws that would
be invalidated in a given year would most likely be relatively small.
Therefore, a legislature would have virtually no incentive to scour the
books just so they can preemptively avoid the occasional judicial
invalidation of a law.
A legislature would certainly need to expend resources to review a law
in light of the contemporaneous facts when a person files a claim alleging
changed circumstances. But this is simply the consequence of judicial
review and would not seem to increase the institutional costs beyond what
the legislature should otherwise expect. In fact, the review process for
everyone involved—challenger, government, and court—might be
considerably less burdensome because everyone spared trying to ascertain
elusive factual conditions from the past or arcane legislative histories. In
any event, legislators might have little investment in these outdated laws,
could be happy to see them go, and would be unlikely to waste the time or
effort on amending them. Even if the changed circumstances doctrine could
lead to some increased institutional costs for the legislature, this hardly
seems a strong reason to contravene an established and valuable principle of
constitutional analysis.
As a concluding observation, one positive effect of the changed
circumstances doctrine is that it could enhance judicial protections of
economic liberty. The current state of rational basis review and the Court’s
disfavored treatment of economic liberty are not only contrary to the
constitutional framers’ intent and purpose,226 they can also lead to extensive
negative consequences.227 As lower courts and state courts of last resort
demonstrate a greater willingness to subject economic regulations to
genuine factual scrutiny under rational basis review,228 the changed
circumstances doctrine could prove an important judicial tool to eliminate
arcane regulations that no longer comport with the Constitution.
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The issues that the changed circumstances doctrine addresses are
particularly salient to economic regulation. Economic laws are present in
virtually every facet of our lives––the vast majority of occupations,
industries, products, and markets are subject to some degree of regulation
from one or more levels of government.229 Given the remarkable rate of
human innovation, social change, and the malleability of markets, economic
regulations are uniquely susceptible to obsolescence.230 The consequences
of an overabundance of arcane and cumbersome regulation can be highly
detrimental––hindering economic growth, for example, or disparately
limiting economic opportunities for poor and minority populations.231
Moreover, economic regulation is uniquely prone to abuses—embedded,
politically-connected businesses encouraging government regulation as a
shield against competition under a guise of protecting public health, safety,
and welfare.232
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229
See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 227; Simpson, supra note 227; DICK M. CARPENTER II ET AL.,
INST. FOR JUSTICE, LICENSE TO WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY OF BURDENS FROM OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING 6–7 (2012), www.ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/licensetowork1.pdf; Michael D.
Tanner, Too Many Laws, Too Much Regulation, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 2, 2016, 4:00 AM), www.national
review.com/article/432181/regulation-versus-freedom; Over-Regulated America, ECONOMIST (Feb. 18,
2012), www.economist.com/node/21547789.
230
See, e.g., Christopher Koopman & Patrick McLaughlin, When Technology Makes Regulations
Obsolete, MERCATUS CTR. (May 11, 2016), www.mercatus.org/expert_commentary/when-technologymakes-regulations-obsolete; Phillip K. Howard, How Stupid, Redundant, Obsolete Laws Are Paralyzing
Us, FISCAL TIMES: REBOOT AMERICA (Feb. 24, 2015), http://rebootamerica.thefiscaltimes.com/index.
php/how-stupid-redundant-obsolete-laws-are-paralyzing-us.
231
See, e.g., John W. Dawson & John J. Seater, Federal Regulation and Aggregate Economic
Growth, 18 J. ECON. GROWTH 137 (2013) (growth of federal regulation over the past sixty years
decreased economic growth by an average two percent per year); Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due
Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 S. Ct. 34, 50 (1962); Raynor, supra
note 1, at 1094–95; Scott Beyer, How San Francisco’s Progressive Policies Are Hurting the Poor,
REASON (Nov. 9, 2014), www.reason.com/archives/2014/11/09/how-san-franciscos-progressive-pol
icies.
232
A circuit split has emerged over the last decade and a half regarding whether naked
protectionism, with nothing more, qualifies as a legitimate government purpose for economic regulation.
Compare Sensational Smiles, LLC v. Mullen, 793 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2015), and Powers v. Harris, 379
F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2004), with St. Joseph Abbey v. Castille, 712 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2013), and
Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449
U.S. 456, 471 (1981) (under the Commerce Clause, “[i]f a state law purporting to promote
environmental purposes is in reality ‘simple economic protectionism,’ [the Court has] applied a
‘virtually per se rule of invalidity’”). In economic regulation cases, as noted above, the changed
circumstances doctrine will typically focus on the objective facts and their bearing on the means-end
relationship between a law and the government’s purpose. But if pure economic protectionism, without
any associated public health, safety, or welfare benefits, is a legitimate government purpose, then it
seems unlikely that economic regulation could ever be held unconstitutional. Almost all laws could be
justified as means to further protectionist purposes. Under this scenario, the objective facts no longer
matter, much less whether those facts have changed. For different perspectives on the circuit split, see
generally Evan Bernick, Towards a Consistent Economic Liberty Jurisprudence, 23 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 479 (2016); Katherine M. Rudish, Unearthing the Public Interest: Recognizing Intrastate
Economic Protectionism as a Legitimate Government Interest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1485 (2012).
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See Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 480–83 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Brown, J., concurring).
Id. at 475 (majority opinion).
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 482 (Brown, J., concurring) (“Rational basis review means property is at the mercy of
the pillagers. The constitutional guarantee of liberty deserves more respect—a lot more.”).
239 Id. (Brown, J., concurring) (“To be sure, the economic climate [during the Depression] was
truly dire, but 78 years later, the same tired trope about ‘disorderly market conduct’ is still extant.”)
(citing Alto Dairy v. Veneman, 336 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 2003)). Judge Brown also hinted at the role
of changed circumstances in Edwards v. District of Columbia, a First Amendment challenge to the
licensing requirements for tour guides in the District of Columbia. Stating that “reliance on decades-old
evidence says nothing of the present state of affairs,” Judge Brown discussed modern circumstances,
which include crowd-sourcing review operations such as Yelp and TripAdvisor, that undermined the
District’s argument that licensing was necessary to protect the public from unscrupulous tour guides
who fleece unsuspecting tourists. See Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
234
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Broad grants of government power to regulate economic activities––
even those originally intended to serve the public health, safety, and
welfare––can, over time, begin to serve primarily protectionist ends. Judge
Brown of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
expressed great concern about this in her concurrence in Hettinga v. United
States.233 The majority upheld certain provisions under the Milk Regulatory
Equity Act (MREA), which imposed complex price controls upon milk
producers and handlers and required both to pay into a redistributive
fund.234 One enterprising dairyman found a way to sell gallons of milk for
twenty cents less than his competitors by taking advantage of a producerhandler exemption.235 Dairy lobbyists successfully petitioned to have the
exemption eliminated.236 The court upheld the revised regulations under
rational basis review.237
Judge Brown lamented that the court was bound to reach the
conclusion that it did, explaining that the Supreme Court had “abdicated its
constitutional duty to protect economic rights” in its development of
rational basis review and relegation of economic liberty to a “lower echelon
of constitutional protection.”238 Judge Brown suggested that once-legitimate
interests underlying the enactment of the MREA—correcting “disorderly
market conduct” after the Depression––no longer existed, and the only
remaining purpose was to enrich the dairy industry at the expense of
consumers.239 The exact situation in Hettinga would not have presented an
ideal opportunity for challenge under the changed circumstances doctrine—
the challenged government action was a recent legislative enactment to
close the producer-handler exemption. But there is certainly a changed
circumstances argument to be made that the broader MREA regulatory
scheme places “current burdens” on economic liberty that may very well
not be “justified by current needs.”
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The impact that the changed circumstances doctrine could have in
terms of scaling back judicial deference or helping to restore economic
liberty is modest––it is little more than rational basis review with nibble. As
Shelby County illustrates, the changed circumstances doctrine is a
minimalist approach. It does not require altering the rational basis standard
or changing the constitutional status of economic liberties. And the class of
claims to which the changed circumstances doctrine might apply is
relatively narrow. But for those whose economic liberties are impeded by
cumbersome and outdated economic regulations, the changed circumstances
doctrine could provide a small, but meaningful opportunity to wage
effective challenges in court to vindicate their constitutional rights.
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